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Warren D. Hannah Director – Federal Regulatory Relations Local Telecommunications Division

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION OFFICE OF SECRETARY

EX PARTE

September 26, 1996

Mr. William F. Caton Acting Secretary Federal Communications Commission 1919 M Street, N.W. Room 222 Washington, D.C. 20554

RE:

In the Matter of Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service

CC Docket No. 96-45

Dear Mr. Caton:

Today, representatives of Sprint Corporation met with Ms. Kathy Levitz and Mr. Tim Peterson, of the Common Carrier Bureau, to discuss Sprint's position in the above referenced docket. Attached is the handout used in the discussion.

Representing Sprint Corporation were: Jay Keithley, Dick Juhnke, and Jim Sichter. We request that this information be made a part of the record in this matter. Two copies of this letter, in accordance with Section 1.1206(a)(1), are provided for this purpose. If you have any questions, please feel free to call.

Sincerely,

Warren D. Hannah

Attachments


cc:

Kathy Levitz

Tim Peterson

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UNIVERSAL SERVICE SPRINT'S PLAN FOR SUPPORT



ACCESS REFORM AND UNIVERSAL SERVICE

- Unsustainability of internal (Implicit) Subsidie
- Impact of Access Reform



UNSUSTAINABILITY OF INTERNAL (IMPLICIT) SUBSIDIES

Maintaining Universal Service Support through internal "cross subsidies" is Inconsistent with the Telecom Act, and is Incompatible with, and Unsustainable in, a Competitive Market Place

- Problems with Embedding "Subsidies" in LEC Prices
 - Neither explicit nor targeted
 - Artificially low rates (for the subsidized services) are a barrier to competitive entry
 - Artificially high rates (for the services providing the subsidy)...
 - Provide incorrect price signals to potential entrants
 - Are unsustainable



Unsustainability of Current Ix Access Rates in a Competitive Environment

- The Telecom Act of 1996 requires incumbent LECs to provide unbundled Network Elements to competitive LECS at cost-based rates
 - Creating an arbitrage opportunity to the extent that the total revenues (Local and Access) generated by an element under the existing rate structures exceed the costs for that unbundled element
 - And, ultimately, undermining the cross-subsidies embedded in existing rate structures
- New Entrants can undermine Access Rates
 - If rate level too high (above economic costs)
 - If rate structures inefficient
 - e.g., per MOU recovery of fixed or NTS costs

Carrier Common Line Revenues Disaggregated by Customer Usage

	Usage	Access	% of	CCL Revenue	% of	CC	L Revenue
	Segment MOU/Month	Lines	Total	(Inter & Intra)	Total		per Line
	Residental			•			
	0	70,447	2.5% \$		0.0%	\$	-
	0-100	767,815	27.2% \$	673,485	3.1%	\$	0.88
	100-200	442,665	15.7% \$	1,326,621	6.2%	\$.	3.00
	200-300	324,892	11.5% \$	1,591,209	7.4%	\$	4.90
	300-1000	939,235	33.3% \$	9,753,185	45.5%	\$	10.38
	1000-2000	226,949	8.0% \$	5,399,230	25.2%	\$	23.79
•	2000-5000	50,405	1.8% \$	2,335,103	10.9%	\$	46.33
	5000+	2,358	0.1% \$	348,841	1.6%	\$	147.94
	TOTAL	2,824,766	100.0% \$	21,427,675	100.0%	\$	7.59
		V.					
	Business						
	0	193,955	14.3% \$	_	0.0%	\$	- 1
	0-100	567,692	42.0% \$	363,886	3.5%	\$	0.64
	100-200	152,528	11.3% \$	477,805	4.5%	\$	3.13
	200-300	94,035	7.0% \$	493,989	4.7%	\$	5.25
	300-1000	235,348	17.4% \$	2,710,393	25.8%	\$	11.52
	1000-2000	67,702	5.0% \$	1,938,895	18.4%	\$	28.64
	2000-5000	31,536	2.3% \$	1,993,250	19.0%	\$	63.21
	5000+	9,617	<u>0.7</u> % \$	2,534,321	24.1%	\$	263.53
	TOTAL	1,352,413	100.0% \$	10,512,539	100.0%	\$	7.77

Note: Based on November 1995 billing records for United & Centel Florida, CT&T Centel of North Carolina, Ohio, United & Centel Texas, Illinois and Missouri



Local Switching "Subsidy"* Disaggregated by Cusomer Usage

Usage Segment MOU/Month	Access Lines	% of Total	Local Switching (Inter & Intra)	% of Total	Local Switching per Line
Residental	• • .				•
0	70,447	2.5% \$	•	0.0%	
0-100	767,815	27.2% \$	316,420	2.9%	0.41
100-200	442,665	15.7% \$	642,250	5.9%	1.45
200-300	324,892	11.5% \$	782,421	. 7.1% \$	2.41
300-1000	939,235	33.3% \$	4,947,455	45.1% \$	5.27
1000-2000	226,949	8.0% \$	2,839,538	25.9% \$	12.51
2000-5000	50,405	1.8% \$	1,268,355	11.6% \$	25.16
5000÷	2,358	0.1% \$	182,012	1.7% \$	77.19
TOTAL	2,824,766	100.0% \$	10,978,451	100.0% \$	3.89
Business		•			
0	193,955	14.3% \$		0.0% \$	
0-100	567,692	42.0% \$	164,100	3.4% \$	
100-200	152,528	11.3% \$	222,116	4.6% \$	
200-300	94,035	7.0% \$	232,429	4.8% \$	
300-1000	235,348	17.4% \$	1,292,699	26.9% \$	5.49
1000-2000	67,702	5.0% \$	919,511	19.1% \$	13.58
2000-5000	31,536	2.3% \$	898,966	18.7% \$	28.51
5000+	9,617	<u>0.7</u> % \$	1,075,655	<u>22.4% \$</u>	111.85
TOTAL	1,352,413	100.0% \$	4,805,476	100.0% \$	3.55

Note: Based on November 1995 billing records for United & Centel Florida, CTYT Centel of North Carolina, Ohio, United & Centel Texas Illinois and Missouri

*Difference between current access rates and local termination proxy of \$.02/Mou



Interconnection Charge (RIC) Disaggregated by Customer Usage

Usage Segment MOU/Month	Access Lines	% of Total	RIC (Inter & Intra)	% of Total	RIC per Line
•	•			•	
Residental					
	70.447	0.50	, :	0.00	
0	70,447	2.5%		0.0% \$	
0-100	767,815	27.2%		2.6% \$	 -
100-200	442,665	15.7%		5.5% \$	0.88
200-300	324,892	11.5%	,	6.9% \$	
300-1000	939,235	33.3%		45.2% \$	
1000-2000	226,949	8.0%	1,866,694.63	26.4% \$	
2000-5000	50,405	1.8%	828,011.64	11.7% \$	16.43
5000+ ·	2,358	0.1%	114,554.23	<u>1.6% \$</u>	48.58
TOTAL	2,824,766	100%	7,069,227	100.0% \$	2.50
Business					
0	193,955	14.3% \$	•	0.0% \$	_
0-100	567,692	42.0% \$	94,732	3.2% \$	0.17
100-200	152,528	11.3% \$		4.5% \$	0.86
200-300	94,035	7.0% \$		4.7% \$	1.48
300-1000	235,348	17.4% \$	•	26.7% \$	3.34
1000-2000	67,702	5.0% \$		19.2% \$	8.35
2000-5000	31,536	2.3% \$		19.0% \$	17.77
5000+	9,617	0.7% \$		22.7% \$	69.43
-		- -			
TOTAL	1,352,413	100.0% \$	2,945,186	100.0% \$	2.18

Note: Based on November 1995 billing records for United & Centel Florida, CT&T Centel of North Carolina, Ohio, United & Centel Texas, Illinois and Missouri



Total Access Subsidy Disaggregated

	• * * *	•	•	•				
	Usage	Access	% of		Access Subsidy	% of		Access Subsidy
	Segment	Lines	Total		(Inter & Intra)	Total		per Line
•	Residental				•			
	0	70,447	2.5%	\$ ·		0.0%	\$	·
	0-100	767,815	27.2%	\$	1,175,135	3.0%	\$	1.53
	100-200	442,665	15.7%	\$	2,360,336	6.0%	\$	5.33
	200-300	324,892	11.5%		2,862,445	7.3%	\$	8.81
	300-1000	939,235	33.3%	\$	17,895,097	45.3%	\$	19.05
	1000-2000	226,949	8.0%	\$	10,105,463	25.6%	\$	44.53
	2000-5000	50,405	1.8%	\$	4,431,469	11.2%	\$	87 <i>.</i> 92
	5000+	2,358	0.1%	\$	645,408	<u>1.6</u> %	\$_	27 <u>3.71</u>
	TOTAL	2,824,766	100.0%	\$	39,475,354	100.0%		13.97
	Business		•		•.			
	0	193,955	14.3%	\$	•	0.0%	S	•
	0-100	567,692	42.0%		622,717	3.4%	Š	1.10
	100-200	152,528	11.3%	\$	830,993	4.6%	Š	5.45
	200-300	94,035	7.0%	3	865,571	4.7%	\$	9.20
	300-1000	235,348	17.4%	\$	4,790,106	26.2%	\$	20.35
	1000-2000	67,702	5.0%	\$	3,423,659	18.7%	\$	50. 5 7
	2000-5000	31,536	2.3%	\$	3,452,473	18.9%	\$	109.48
	5000+	9,617	0.7%	\$	4,277,683	23.4%	\$	444.80
	TOTAL	1,352,413		\$	18,263,202		\$	13.50

Note: Based on November 1995 billing records for United & Centel Florida, CT&T Centel of North Carolina, Ohio, United & Centel Texas, Illinois and Missouri



Sustainability Example: Carrier Common Line Charge

Recovery of NTS Loop Costs through per MOU Charge

- Results in high users contributing well in excess of the costs of their loops
- Providing incentive for IXCs (or CLECs) to "cap" the access costs of serving these customers by serving them through either non-ILEC facilities or resold ILEC loops

	CCLC Revenue <u>Generated by Customer</u>	Unbundled Loop Cost	Access Savings to IXC. Net Revenue gain to CLEC.
Residential Customer	\$46.33	\$20.00	\$26.33
Business Customer	\$63.21	\$15.00	\$48.21




Comparison between IX Access and Local Interconnection Pricing

	•	Local		Transport
	Loop	Switching	Transport	RIC .
IX Access (Industry Average)	\$.00834/MOU	J \$.00991/MOU	J \$.00250/MOU	\$.00674/MOU
	Ain Nin			N. T.
•(Transport and	ction Not included	TE-LRIC* 1 (.2c4c/MC	TE-LRIC* OU)	Not included

*Per FCC 96-98 Order



Revenue Impact of Pricing IX Access at Local Interconnection Levels (Industry Totals Interstate Only)



Current Switched Access Revenues

Switched Access Revenues at Local Interconnection Levels



SPRINT UNIVERSAL SERVICE PLAN

- Principles
- Services Eligible for Subsidies
- Determination of Subsidy
- Costing Standard
- Eligibility Criteria for Receiving the Subsidy
- Implementation
- Funding
- Administration of Funds



Sprint Plan

Sprint Universal Service Plan -- Principles

- Competitive Neutrality
 - Should Not Impair Competition
 - All earriers should contribute to USF on an equitable basis
 - Subsidy Funding Should be Portable
 - · Available to all qualified providers of local service
- Specific (Targeted)
- Predictable
- Eliminate Current Internal (Implicit) Subsidy Flows, as well as replace Existing Explicit Subsidy Funding

SPRINT PLAN SERVICES ELIGIBLE FOR SUBSIDIES

- Residential Services Only
- Initial Service Definition
 - Local Dial Tone and Ability to Make Local Calls
 - Access to Chosen Long Distance Carrier
 - Access to Emergency Services
 - Single Party Service
 - Touch Tone
 - Annual Local Directory
 - Directory Assistance

SPRINT PLAN DETERMINATION OF SUBSIDY

- Income Related Subsidies
 - Lifeline, Linkup, and Other Explicit Subsidy
 Mechanisms to Support Low Income
 Subscribers Would Continue
- High Cost Area Subsidies
 - Available to Subsidize Basic Residential
 Service in Areas Where the Costs of
 Providing Service Exceed National and State
 Standard for "Affordable" Rate



SPRINT PLAN COSTING STANDARD FOR DETERMINING HIGH COST AREAS

- The Benchmark Cost Model Should be the Basis for Measuring the Costs of Providing Services for USF Purposes.
 - The BCM is a Reasonable Proxy for the Economic Costs of Serving a Particular Area
- Advantages of the BCM
 - Based on Objective, Verifiable, Public Data and Accepted
 Network Engineering Standards
 - Cost Results not Distorted by Historic Accounting and Depreciation
 Policies
 - Opes Not Require Arbitrary Allocations or Dissagregations of Existing Investment to Smaller Geographic Units
 - Avoids Controversy Over Whether Embedded Costs Represent.
 "Efficient" or "Inefficient" Management



SPRINT PLAN COSTING STANDARD FOR DETERMINING HUGIEL COST AREAS

Advantages of the BCM (continued)

- Competitively Neutral
 - Subsidy funding (per subscriber) will be the Same for all Services
 Providers
 - The BCM is a Proxy for the Costs that <u>Any Efficient Provider</u> would Incur in Providing Service to a Particular Area
 - Subsidy Amount Not biased by an Incumbent's Embedded Costs
 - ° Provides Incentive for Competitive Entry into High Cost Areas
 - ° Provides Incentive for Efficiency
 - ° Provides Incentive for Innovation



SPRINT PLAN COSTING STANDARD FOR DETERMINING HIGH COST AREAS

Advantages of the BCM (continued)

- Disaggregation of Costs By Census Blocks
 Group (CBG)
 - More Precisely Identifies Truly High Cost Areas
 - Avoids Competitive distortions Inherent in Using Higher Levels of Aggregation (e.g. exchange or study area) for USF Purposes
 - Obsides on Averaged Costs will not Provide New Entrants Sufficient Incentives to Serve Those Areas Where Costs Exceed the Average (potentially leading to "cream-skimming")



SPRINT PLAN DETERMINATION OF THE AMOUNTS OF SUBSIDY

- The Amount of Subsidy Provided for a CBG Would be the Difference Between
 - The National Benchmark Price for Basic Residential Service (i.e., the maximum rate determined to be "reasonable" and "affordable"), and the
 - BCM-Calculated Cost For that CBG
- The National Benchmark Price Should be Set at Least at the National Average Rate for Basic Residential Service in <u>Urban</u> areas, Including the Existing Subscriber Line Charge.
- State USF Plans Could Use the Same Methodology to the Extent State Repricing Does Not Resolve All State-Specific Subsidies



SPRINT PLAN DETERMINATION OF THE AMOUNT OF SUBSIDY: EXAMPLE

Assume:

Federal Subsidy (per Access Line)

1.	BCM Cost	\$30
2.	FCC Benchmark Price	\$20
3.	Federal Subsidy (L1-L2)	\$10

State Subsidy (Per Access Line

4.	State Benchmark Price	\$15
5.	State Subsidy (L2-L4)	\$5



SPRINT PLAN USF FUND SIZE AT ALTERNATIVE NATIONAL BENCHMARK PRICE LEVELS

Summary Model Results
National Total
(\$) (Billions)

Annual

Benchmark Cost

\$59,252

Aggregate Support

at \$20 \$14,666

at 30 \$7,425

at 40 \$4,259

Average

Monthly Cost \$29.98





- USF Funding Will be Available to Both Incumbent LECs and New Entrants
- To Qualify for USF Funding, an ETC (Eligible Telecommunications Carrier) Must:
 - Be Willing to Serve the Entire Service Area
 - Offer All of the Services that are Supported by the Fund
 - Use Their Own Facilities or a Combination of Owned Facilities and Resale of Another Carrier's Facilities
- An ETC Will Receive Support Only Where It Provides Service Either Over Its Own Facilities or Over Resold Facilities For Which It Pays Cost-Based Rates
- USF Support Should be Portable (When Subscribers Change Their Local Service Provider, the Subsidy Payment Should Then Go to the New Service Provider)

Sprint Plan Implementation

- Implementation Steps
 - Each Incumbent LEC Would Quantify its Net Change in USF Support (i.e., USF Support Under the New Plan Less USF Support it Received Under the Existing Plan)
 - The Incremental USF Funding Would Flow Through, Dollar for Dollar, in Reductions in Embedded Subsidies; e.g.,
 - CCLC
 - Transport RIC